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Th e Case for Banning Payday Lending: 
Snapshots from Four Key States
May 2013
For years, community groups and advocates around the country have 
waged pitched battles to eliminate payday lending in their respective states. 
Notwithstanding extensive documentation of the payday lending debt 
trap and the billions of dollars payday lenders have systematically stripped 
from low-income families and communities, especially those of color, the 
payday lending industry has cannily built and exerted its political power in 
state capitols throughout the U.S. As a result, many states permit usurious 
payday lending, with oft en dire consequences for millions of payday loan 
borrowers already struggling to make ends meet. 
A key move in the industry’s playbook is to convince states that the best 
way to address predatory payday lending is to regulate the industry. But 
regulations in states that authorize payday loans are too oft en written by 
industry and porous at best, and across the board fail to eliminate the 
hooks that trap people in these usurious and harmful loans. Other less 
subtle strategies the industry employs are to co-opt state legislators through 
generous campaign contributions, and to lobby aggressively against any 
and all attempts to prohibit or curtail payday lending.  
Th is report presents snapshots on payday loan regulation in four key 
states – California, Illinois, New York, and North Carolina. Th e snapshots 
are intended to provide helpful lessons and serve as a useful basis for 
comparison. Although New York has long prohibited payday lending 
altogether through its strong usury law, North Carolina opened the door 
to payday lending for fi ve years before restoring its previous ban in 2001. 
Illinois, by contrast, has attempted to restrict payday lending through a 
series of legislative and regulatory reforms adopted over the past 12 years, 
many of which the industry immediately circumvented. California, for its 
part, has few payday loan regulations on the books. While some cities and 
counties in California have sought to curb payday lending by passing local 
ordinances, the industry has to date successfully thwarted all eff orts to pass 
meaningful state-level protections.
Th e four organizations that prepared the snapshots – California 
Reinvestment Coalition, New Economy Project (formerly NEDAP), 
Reinvestment Partners, and Woodstock Institute – off er their perspective 
as fi nancial justice advocates that have been in the thick of payday lending 
battles in their home states. Th eir direct experience with a range of 
regulatory frameworks has shown that strong usury caps have proven the 
single most eff ective means of banning payday lending.
Th e report comes at an exciting time. Advocates have spent years 
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refuting and defending against the payday lending industry’s shameless 
and aggressive lobbying, and there is now a clear turning of the tide. 
Last month, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau published 
a comprehensive study on storefront and bank payday loans, which 
showed how payday loans lead many borrowers to a long-term cycle of 
indebtedness. Th at same week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
and Offi  ce of the Comptroller of the Currency issued strong proposed 
guidance that would eff ectively rein in predatory payday lending by banks. 
Th ere is an emerging chorus at local, state, and federal levels calling for an 
end to payday lending – whether by banks, storefront payday lenders, or 
over the internet – and the squeeze is now squarely on the industry. Th e 
changing dynamic will likely increase pressure in battleground states, such 
as California and Illinois, and we hope soon to see strong federal action 
that ends payday lending once and for all. 
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California Snapshot
Payday lending is a relatively new phenomenon in California. In 1996, 
the state legislature legalized payday loans by permitting check cashers 
to defer the deposit of personal checks written by their customers for up 
to 30 days.1   Th e short history of payday lending in California has been 
tumultuous, with advocates, legislators, and industry constantly at odds 
with one another over the abusive nature of payday loans and the need for 
regulation and consumer protections. 
Th e payday lending industry saw dramatic growth in California during 
the early- to mid-2000s. At one point, the number of payday lending 
storefronts exceeded the number of McDonald’s in the state.2  While 
payday lenders reap enormous profi ts by pushing millions of economically 
vulnerable Californians deep into debt, the state legislature has done 
nothing to protect consumers. 
Policy makers in cities and counties throughout California, however, have 
recognized the harmful eff ects of the payday loan debt trap, and major 
cities such as San Francisco, Oakland, Sacramento, Oceanside, and San 
Jose, along with a slew of smaller cities, have adopted land use ordinances 
to restrict the growth of the industry. Several cities, including San Diego, 
have adopted resolutions calling on the state to take action to end abusive 
payday lending. 
Despite a groundswell of support from local communities and 
governments for increased oversight and regulation of payday lenders, key 
members of the California State Senate and Assembly have been reluctant 
to enact legislation to end or even curtail predatory payday lending. 
Interestingly, there has been a regional divide among legislators, with San 
Francisco Bay Area and northern California members more oft en voting 
in support of proposals to rein in the payday loan industry, and those 
from the greater Los Angeles region siding with the trade associations and 
payday loan corporations. 
Overview
California’s payday lending law permits a maximum loan amount of $300, 
including the fee, and prohibits lenders from off ering borrowers more 
than one payday loan at a time. Th e law states that if a lender speaks to 
the borrower in a language other than English, the loan documents must 
be in that same language. Finally, the law permits borrowers to request 
1  Farouk, Mark, Kathleen O’Malley, and Tiff any Morrison. California Deferred Deposit 
Transaction Law. Report to Assembly Committee on Banking and Finance, 4 March 2013. 
(hereinaft er “Report to Assembly Committee”)
2 Graves, Steven M. “Th ink Payday Lending Isn’t Out of Control in the United States?” 
California State University Northridge Geography, 2006. Web. 16 May 2013. http://www.
csun.edu/~sg4002/research/mcdonalds_by_state.htm
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an extension of the payment due date or to make payments on an existing 
payday loan for no additional fee, though most borrowers are unaware of these 
options. 
In 2002, the legislature enacted the California Deferred Deposit Transaction 
Law (CDDTL), which shift ed payday lending oversight from the state’s 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to the state’s Department of Corporations 
(DOC). In addition to imposing licensing requirements, the law requires 
payday lenders to disclose certain information to consumers, including fi nance 
charges and interest expressed as an annual percentage rate (APR). Th e law, 
however, does not curtail high interest and fees that payday lenders typically 
charge, and generally falls short of providing any meaningful consumer 
protections.
By 2006, there were nearly 2,500 storefronts across the state that made 10 
million loans to 1.4 million borrowers that year.  Following the fi nancial 
collapse of 2007, the number of brick-and-mortar outlets declined to around 
2,100 at the end of 2011. Th e number of Californians using payday loans has 
grown, however, from 1.6 million in 2009 to 1.7 million in 2011.3   Th e payday 
lending industry collected an estimated $578 million in fees in 2011.
According to the DOC, borrowers in California take out an average of 7-10 
loans per year.4  Th ese numbers illustrate the debt trap that oft en ensues once 
a consumer takes out an initial payday loan, and the fact that payday loans are 
not the short-term fi xes the industry purports them to be.  In 2011, payday 
lending caused a net economic loss to California of $135 million.5 
Th e Industry
Although there are hundreds of payday loan companies in California, 
including national chains, large statewide companies, and some mom-and-
pop stores, the fi ve biggest payday loan companies hold almost half of all the 
payday lender licenses in the state. Los Angeles, Sacramento, Fresno, and San 
Diego have the highest numbers of payday lenders in the state.
Th e state’s largest payday lenders and the industry trade associations have 
aggressively and successfully lobbied against local and statewide reform 
3 Department of Corporations. 2011 Annual Report, Operation of Deferred Deposit Orig-
inators licensed under the California Deferred Deposit Transaction Law. State of California: 
Business, Transportation and Housing Agency, Department of Corporations, 2012. Web. 
http://www.corp.ca.gov/Laws/Payday_Lenders/pdfs/CDDTL2011ARC.pdf (hereinaft er “2011 
Annual Report”)
4 Applied Management & Planning Group and Analytic Focus. 2007 Department of Corpo-
rations Payday Loan Study. Submitted to the California Department of Corporations, Decem-
ber 2007; Updated June 2008. Web. http://www.corp.ca.gov/Laws/Payday_Lenders/Archives/
pdfs/PDLStudy07.pdf
5 Lohrentz, Tim. Th e Net Economic Impact of Payday Lending in the U.S.. Insight Center for 
Community Economic Development. March 2013. Web. http://www.insightcced.org/uploads/
assets/Net%20Economic%20Impact%20of%20Payday%20Lending.pdf
Th e state’s 
largest payday 
lenders and 
the industry 
trade 
associations 
have 
aggressively 
and 
successfully 
lobbied against 
local and 
statewide 
reform eff orts.
Page  7
eff orts. Th e payday lending industry has also made substantial contributions 
to legislators and party committees. From May 2008 to May 2012, the top ten 
Senate recipients of contributions from payday lenders received approximately 
$222,000, and the top ten Assembly recipients received $150,000.6 
Two of the country’s largest banks, Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank, also make 
high-cost payday loans in California.7   Although these bank payday loans are 
marginally less expensive than storefront payday loans, they create a similar 
cycle of debt and cause the same overall harm to borrowers.  Neither bank 
has been willing to share data with community organizations, but both banks 
clearly add signifi cantly to the number of borrowers ensnared in payday 
loan debt.  Borrowers of these banks’ payday loans have told California 
Reinvestment Coalition that they trusted their bank and did not realize how 
predatory these loans were until they had been trapped in debt for months. 
Although bank lobbyists have not publicly opposed payday lending legislation 
in California, voting patterns suggest that the lobbyists are infl uencing 
legislators behind closed doors.
Local Responses
Communities across the state are increasingly concerned about the harmful 
social and economic impact of payday lending on people and neighborhoods, 
and many city-level policy makers want to curb abusive payday lending 
practices.  Preempted by state law and regulatory authority, local jurisdictions 
in California have sought to regulate payday lending by exercising their 
land use authority. By passing local zoning ordinances, for example, cities 
have made it more diffi  cult for payday loan companies to open up shop and 
have gone on public record that they are opposed to the industry’s harmful 
practices.
Oakland, Oceanside, Sacramento, San Francisco, and San Jose have adopted 
local policies to curb payday lending, ranging from restrictions on permits for 
payday loan businesses to caps on  the number of payday loan stores permitted 
citywide. Some cities and counties, including Santa Clara County, have passed 
interim or permanent moratoria on new payday lending storefronts. Local 
campaigns to pass land use ordinances have served as platforms to educate 
community groups, elected offi  cials, and the public, and to build a network of 
advocates and activists throughout the state on the abusive nature of payday 
loans.
Payday Lending Reform in Sacramento
State legislative eff orts to address payday lending have been extremely 
frustrating, to say the least.  On one hand, there has been a constant fl ow 
6  MapLight. “Payday/Title Loans Interest Group Contributions.” MapLight California. n.d. 
Web. 16 May 2013.  http://maplight.org/california/interest/F5400
7 Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank refer to their payday loan products as “direct deposit advance” 
and “checking advance,” respectively.
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of proposals to strengthen payday lending regulation and consumer 
protections, which industry has defeated. On the other hand, there have 
been proposals to increase permissible payday loan amounts, as well as to 
allow internet-based payday lending, which advocates have blocked.
Attempts to enact an interest rate cap in California have failed. A 2008 
proposal to cap payday loan APRs at 36% was defeated in the Assembly 
banking committee. In 2010, a similar cap for borrowers receiving 
unemployment benefi ts also died in committee.8  Legislators have refused 
to enact a rate cap because of the industry’s claims that they would not 
be able to make a profi t if APRs were capped at 36%, that payday lenders 
would be forced to shut down shop and leave the state, and that this would 
leave Californians without access to small dollar credit.  
Since then, advocates in California have stymied two industry-backed 
bills that would have increased maximum loan limits from $300 to $500. 
In the spring of 2013, a coalition that included California Reinvestment 
Coalition, the Center for Responsible Lending, the Law Foundation of 
Silicon Valley, and National Council of La Raza supported a state bill to 
cap the number of times a lender could make a loan to a borrower at four 
per year, impose an underwriting requirement, and extend the minimum 
repayment period to 30 days per $100 borrowed (so that a borrower would 
have 90 days to repay a $300 loan). Th ough they fall short of imposing an 
interest rate cap, these incremental reforms would go far to addressing the 
payday loan debt trap. Unfortunately, even though the bill’s supporters and 
sponsors were willing to make signifi cant compromises, the bill failed to 
garner the fi ve votes needed to pass out of the Senate banking committee.  
Conclusion
California advocates believe that the state legislature is unlikely to rein 
in the payday loan industry absent some dramatic shift  in capitol politics 
and the composition of key legislative committees. Running a statewide 
ballot initiative is another possible strategy, but the cost of operating an 
electoral campaign presents a barrier. In the meantime, many organizations 
continue to educate community groups and local leaders on the abusive 
nature of payday loans and build support for local campaigns. Advocates 
also plan to refocus eff orts towards engaging the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau and working with the agency to crack down on payday 
lenders in California and across the country. 
8 Report to Assembly Committee.
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Illinois Snapshot
Introduction
Th e payday lending industry continues to have a strong presence in 
Illinois, notwithstanding a series of reforms the state implemented in 2005 
and 2010 to curb the most predatory aspects of payday loans. Although 
advocates have not succeeded in securing a double-digit interest rate cap 
on all payday loans, which would end abusive payday lending, they have 
won other important consumer protections, including a limit on the 
number of loans a borrower can have at one time, the maximum term of 
the loan, and the number of rollovers.
Th e inability to pass an interest rate cap in Illinois stems in large part from 
the payday loan industry’s political power in the state. Over the years, 
payday lenders and industry groups have contributed signifi cant amounts 
of money to Democrat and Republican political action committees, 
individual legislative campaigns, and party leaders. Th e Illinois Small Loan 
Association, for example, contributed more than $126,000 between 1999 
and 2012; Americash contributed upwards of $300,000 between 2000 and 
2012; and Cottonwood, another prominent payday lender, contributed 
roughly $437,000 over the last 12 years.1  
In addition to making direct campaign contributions, payday lenders in 
Illinois have funded community events, such as school supply drives and 
local festivals, in an attempt to manufacture a positive image with local 
offi  cials and community residents. Furthermore, payday lenders hired a 
signifi cant number of contract lobbyists with insider connections during 
both the 2005 and 2010 eff orts for state reform. 
Another factor limiting advocates’ ability to curb abusive payday lending 
is the Illinois General Assembly’s preference for “negotiated bills” on 
controversial topics. Th is means that advocates must negotiate with the 
payday lenders and garner at least some industry support before a bill 
can move forward in the legislative process. Th is environment makes it 
especially challenging to pass a strong interest rate cap, and advocates 
increasingly believe that abusive payday lending in Illinois will not end 
without federal action. 
History
Th e fi rst payday loans in Illinois were off ered in the late 1990s, and 
carried annual percentage rates (APRs) ranging from 90 to 700 percent. 
Preliminary research indicates that these loans were made most frequently 
to low-income individuals and that 62 percent of borrowers were women. 
Borrowers took out an average of 12.6 payday loans per year, frequently 
1 Illinois State Board of Elections Campaign Disclosure: http://www.elections.il.gov/
CampaignDisclosure/ContributionsSearchByAllContributions.aspx
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renewing loans and thereby remaining in a prolonged cycle of debt.2 
Early advocacy and industry’s evasion of rules
Th e Monsignor John Egan Campaign for Payday Loan Reform formed in 
1999, shortly aft er payday loans had become prevalent in the Chicago area. 
Th is grassroots coalition included research and policy organizations such 
as Woodstock Institute and Citizen Action/Illinois, as well as religiously-
affi  liated entities and other consumer protection groups. 
In 2001, the Egan Coalition persuaded the Illinois Department of Financial 
and Professional Regulations (IDFPR) to adopt consumer protections 
for payday loans with terms less than 30 days. Th e IDFPR’s rules limited 
borrowers to one loan at a time with a maximum of two rollovers and, in 
an eff ort to break borrowers’ cycle of debt, required a “cooling-off ” period 
between loans. Unfortunately, these rules did not include any enforcement 
mechanisms, and payday lenders were immediately able to evade the new 
rules simply by off ering payday products with terms just over 30 days. 
When it became clear that the industry was willfully circumventing 
the IDFPR’s rules, advocates pushed for state legislation. Despite heavy 
protests from the industry, several key state legislators led negotiations 
and refused to back down until protections were implemented. Illinois 
Attorney General Lisa Madigan, a staunch opponent of the payday lending 
industry, also worked with advocates throughout the process, and in 2005, 
Illinois enacted the Payday Loan Reform Act (PLRA). Th e law applies to 
loans with terms of up to 120 days, sets caps on fees and loan amounts, 
limits a borrower to two payday loans at a time, and establishes a seven-
day cooling-off  period between loans. It also created a real-time database, 
maintained by the IDFPR, that lenders must use to verify a borrower’s 
eligibility for a loan. 
Despite the good faith negotiations that led to the PLRA’s passage, the 
industry again found a loophole to exploit shortly aft er the new law went 
into eff ect. Although most loans made before the PLRA had been for well 
under 120 days, one-third of loans made aft er the law went into eff ect 
had terms longer than 120 days. By extending loan terms, lenders were 
able to avoid coverage under the PLRA, and began to operate instead 
under the state’s Consumer Installment Loan Act (CILA), which included 
few consumer protections. Once payday lenders moved into this area, 
borrowers received installment loans with rates as high as 700 percent. 
Strengthening payday lending reforms
Closing this loophole took two years of concerted negotiations, grassroots 
and media campaigns, and research documenting how lenders were 
2 Woodstock Institute. “Reinvestment Alert: Unregulated Payday Lending Pulls Vulnera-
ble Consumers Into Spiraling Debt.” (March, 2000) No. 14.
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changing their products to evade the new law. In 2010, Illinois enacted 
reforms that modifi ed both the PLRA and CILA to ensure basic consumer 
protections, no matter which unsecured product lenders off er. Th e new law 
created a new type of loan under PLRA, the payday installment loan, which 
covers loans with terms between 120 and 180 days, and instituted multiple 
protections, including a $15.50 per $100 rate cap. Longer-term installment 
loans regulated under CILA are now capped at a 99 percent APR for loans 
under $4,000, and 36 percent for loans over $4,000. Balloon payments 
are prohibited for all loans. Lenders must report payday and payday 
installment loans to the IDFPR’s database and may approve loans only aft er 
ensuring that a borrower does not have more than one outstanding loan. 
In addition, lenders must be licensed under either PLRA or CILA, but 
may not be licensed under both, to prevent customers from being rolled 
between products.
While state consumer protections could certainly be stronger, the reforms 
of 2005 and 2010 provide at least some assurance that payday loan 
borrowers in Illinois will not be subjected to an endless cycle of debt. Since 
the 2010 reforms went into eff ect, it appears that neither PLRA nor CILA 
lenders have found any loopholes to exploit. Nevertheless, the payday 
lending industry continues to thrive in Illinois. Currently, 509 licensed 
payday lenders and more than 1,000 licensed CILA lenders operate in 
the state.3  According to the most recent IDFPR database report, payday 
lenders made more than 153,000 loans in 2011, and 106,425 loans in the 
fi rst nine months of 2012. Th e number of payday installment loans is even 
higher. Payday loans continue to be marketed to lower-income borrowers, 
56 percent of whom earn less than $30,000 per year, and 82 percent of 
whom earn less than $50,000 per year. 4
Consumer advocates have continually had to defend against legislation that 
seeks to chip away at the protections passed in 2010. Every year, industry 
lobbyists push to change the enforcement mechanisms, the ban on dual 
licensing, the maximum loan terms, and other provisions. So far, advocates 
have succeeded in defeating these eff orts, but must constantly monitor new 
bills and remind legislators that the compromise legislation of 2010 sets an 
absolute minimum set of protections that should not be pared back. 
Bank and Online Payday Products
Banks, including U.S. Bank, Wells Fargo, Bank of Oklahoma, Fift h Th ird 
Bank, and Regions Bank, along with online payday lenders, are the latest to 
off er predatory payday products in Illinois. Th e banks, in circumvention of 
3 Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulations, Licensee Records: 
http://www.idfpr.com/dfi /LicenseeSearch/EnterLicenseeSearch.asp
4 Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation. “Illinois Trends Report: 
All Consumer Loan Products Th rough September 2012”. Veritech Solutions, LCC. (Sep-
tember 2012)
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state law, are failing to verify borrowers’ ability to repay the loans, allowing 
for multiple rollovers, and imposing balloon payments. Although the 
banks’ fees are somewhat lower than those charged by storefront payday 
lenders, the banks’ payday loans can cause even more harm to borrowers 
because banks have direct access to their customers’ bank accounts. Th ey 
can extract funds regardless of the account balance, and unilaterally 
prioritize repayment of the payday loans over their customers’ other bills, 
such as rent and utilities, and trigger overdraft  fees. Th ese practices oft en 
lead bank payday loan borrowers to take out another predatory loan – 
either at the bank or elsewhere – to pay off  the fi rst loan. Additionally, 
banks do not enter loan information in IDFPR’s database, eff ectively 
skirting state oversight and enforcement. 
Th e proposed rules issued by the FDIC 
and the Offi  ce of the Comptroller of 
Currency in April 2013 on bank payday 
loans would address many of these 
concerns and provide needed oversight 
and enforcement by federal prudential 
regulators.56   
Online payday lenders are acting in a 
similar fashion to banks that off er payday 
loans, skirting Illinois regulations and 
providing Illinois residents with loans 
that do not include consumer protections 
required under state law. Th e Illinois 
legislature passed a law to ensure that 
customers are not required to pay back loans with terms that violate the 
PLRA, but regulators should require banks and online payday lenders to 
abide by the same set of standards or else cease operating in the state.
Conclusion
Since 2010, Illinois laws and regulations have included key consumer 
protections for payday loans.  Despite these laws and regulations, payday 
loans in Illinois still carry triple-digit interest rates that make them very 
hard for borrowers to repay. Furthermore, bank payday loans and online 
payday loans fl out Illinois consumer protections laws, making those loans 
even more harmful to borrowers. Without strong action at the state and 
federal level, payday lenders will continue to operate in Illinois, ensnaring 
its low-income residents in a cycle of debt. 
5 See Offi  ce of the Comptroller of Currency. Proposed Guidance on Deposit Advance 
Products. (April, 2013);
6 See Federal Reserve System. Statement on Deposit Advance Products. (April, 2013), 
CA 13-7.
“Woodstock staff  and other consumer advocates hold a holiday event 
warning potential customers about the dangers of payday loans.
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New York Snapshot
NY Message to Payday Lenders: Keep Out!
Payday lending is categorically illegal in New York, and for most New 
Yorkers is a foreign concept. New York State has long banned payday 
lending through its strong usury laws, which make it a felony to charge 
more than 25 percent on a loan. For years, however, the payday lending 
industry has sought to break into New York’s lucrative market, using a 
battering-ram approach to try to blast open the state’s usury laws. Working 
hand-in-hand with the New York check cashers’ association, the payday 
lending industry has repeatedly pushed bills in Albany that would legalize 
payday lending by exempting licensed check cashers from the state’s 
longstanding usury caps.
In response, a broad-based coalition of community and economic justice 
groups has for many years engaged in concerted organizing, advocacy, 
and media outreach to ensure that New York does not authorize payday 
lending and open the fl oodgates to usurious, wealth-stripping small-dollar 
loans. 
Although it had fl oated various bills over more than a decade, the payday 
lending industry started to gain visible legislative traction in New York 
only in 2010. Th at year, supported by a handful of state legislators, the 
industry got both state legislative houses to introduce bills to legalize 
usurious short-term, small-dollar loans. Th e bills provided a wholesale 
exemption from the state’s civil and criminal usury laws for check cashers 
making these loans. From the get-go, there was little pretense over 
who wrote the bills. State elected offi  cials and their staff , for example, 
blatantly referred to the proposed legislation as “the check cashers’ bill,” 
and frequently discussed substantive amendments that the check cashers 
“planned to introduce.” 
Th e New York check cashers’ association had begun gearing up for the 
legislative push as early as 2007, when it redubbed its “PDA (payday 
advance) Committee” the “Small Loan Committee,” to disassociate its 
rhetoric from notorious payday lending.1  Aware that attempts to off er 
traditional payday loans in New York would not prevail, the industry 
craft ed a bill to permit New York check cashers to off er short-term 
installment loans. It became immediately clear to advocates, however, 
that the bill was a thinly-veiled payday loan scheme. Th e bill expressly 
tied permissible loan amounts, loan application documentation, and 
repayment schedules to a borrowers’ paystubs and pay day. Included, 
practically verbatim, were provisions found in other states’ payday lending 
laws. 
1 Financial Service Centers of New York Board of Directors meeting minutes (Feb. 
2007).
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In an eff ort to mask the true cost of these loans, the bill did not specify the 
exorbitant rates or fees that check cashers would be permitted to charge. 
Rather, the bill would have required the NYS Banking Superintendent to 
set maximum fees and interest for these loans, and to base the fees and 
rates on those charged by similar (i.e., payday) lenders in other states. 
Strikingly, the bill also would have required the Superintendent to ensure 
that interest and fees were high enough to guarantee a profi t to the check 
cashers. 
New Yorkers for Responsible Lending (NYRL), a state-wide coalition of 
more than 160 member organizations,2 organized a campaign to expose 
the true intent of the bill and to educate lawmakers and the general public 
about the harmful eff ects of payday lending. Th e coalition was determined 
to show legislators that the bill was a wolf in sheep’s clothing, but had a 
hard time keeping up with industry lobbyists, who maintained a constant 
presence in Albany. 
Th e bill contained no underwriting safeguards: loans would be based solely 
on people’s paystubs, rather than on their actual ability to repay the loans.  
Th e coalition pointed to the catastrophic experiences of so many payday 
loan borrowers, and the tremendous fi nancial distress and emotional toll 
of the resulting debt trap, in states that permit payday loans. Several bill 
sponsors, particularly in the Assembly, quickly removed their names from 
the bill once they understood that it was not a credit access bill, as industry 
lobbyists had represented, but in fact entailed a dangerous carve-out of the 
state’s usury laws.
Th is year, dogged by the coalition’s strong opposition to and negative 
media around the usury exemption, the industry rewrote the bill to make 
it appear that the loans would comply with the state’s usury laws. Th e 
amended bill, introduced in early 2013, stated that check cashers would 
make short-term, small-dollar loans within the 25 percent usury limit. 
But it also provided for a series of fees, such as application and monthly 
maintenance fees.  Tucked into the 2013 bill was the same carve-out from 
the usury laws contained in previous versions.  Under the terms of the 
amended bill, then, a $300, 90-day loan would carry an APR of 204 percent 
-- more than eight times the state’s usury cap.
It was not lost on advocates or legislative staff  that the industry was 
merely trying to hide the usurious nature of the proposed loans by 
shift ing “interest” to “fees.” Under well-established New York law, interest 
calculations for determining usury entail factoring in both the interest rate 
and fees – not to mention that the bill would have exempted the industry 
altogether from compliance with the state’s usury laws.
2 New Yorkers for Responsible Lending membership list: http://www.nedap.org/pro-
grams/nyrlmembers.html.
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In February 2013, the New York State Department of Financial Services 
(DFS), which oversees both check cashers and state-chartered banks, 
issued a strong letter to licensed debt collectors in the state, reminding 
them that it is illegal to collect on payday and usurious loans – which 
in New York are void and unenforceable – including loans made over 
the Internet. DFS Superintendent Benjamin M. Lawsky advised that his 
agency “would protect consumers from usurious lending, including payday 
lending, through aggressive enforcement of law violations.”3
By spring 2013, the industry eff ort hit a wall, thanks to eff ective coalition 
organizing and a damning newspaper exposé that connected the industry 
campaign contributions to state legislators sponsoring the bill.4  Shortly 
thereaft er, the DFS superintendent sent a letter to the state Assembly 
Speaker expressing the Cuomo Administration’s opposition to the bill. 
Th e administration’s weighing in on pending legislation was virtually 
unprecedented and caught the attention of several newspaper editorial 
boards and local media, which further took bill sponsors to task for crassly 
supporting a toxic payday lending bill in exchange for industry campaign 
contributions. Within days, the Senate bill sponsor disclosed that, in light 
of the governor’s opposition, he would not seek to advance the bill.
Banks Making Payday Loans Need to Stay Away Too
Wells Fargo Bank entered the New York retail market only a few years 
ago, when it acquired Wachovia during the fi nancial meltdown. In early 
2011, Wells Fargo shared its plan to introduce its payday loan product in 
New York, as part of rebranding the old Wachovia branches as Wells Fargo 
outlets. Th e bank intended to use its status as a national bank to evade New 
York’s usury laws, based on federal preemption. 
Good, old-fashioned organizing defeated the bank’s plan. Wachovia’s 
branches in the state were clustered in New York City, and local labor, 
community, legal services, and civil rights groups, along with community 
development fi nancial institutions, quickly banded together to prevent 
Wells Fargo from bringing its usurious payday loans to the state. Th e 
coalition of more than 25 organizations that emerged sent a strong message 
to the bank that New Yorkers were vehemently opposed to circumvention 
of the state’s usury laws, and invoked the potentially serious reputational 
risk to the bank if it were to introduce toxic payday loans in New York. 
Although their immediate concerns pertained to Wells Fargo’s actions in 
New York, the groups also framed its public messaging broadly that the 
bank should not be engaged in payday lending anywhere. 
3 NYS Department of Financial Services, “Letter to all debt collectors operating in the 
State of New York,” February 22, 2013. 
4 Daily News, “Check cashing stores push Albany lawmakers to allow 200% APR loans,” 
April 23, 2013. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/check-cashing-stores-push-of-
fer-200-apr-loans-article-1.1325661#ixzz2UsGeSrAh
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New York groups were especially alarmed by the slippery slope that 
would result from one national bank’s making payday loans in the state, 
which would not only harm low-income New Yorkers but also seriously 
undermine the campaign to keep all forms of payday lending out of the 
state.
Observations
Th e industry’s push in New York was part of a national eff ort to undo 
strong regulation of payday lending at the state level. Th e industry is also 
apparently worried about prospective rule-writing and enforcement action 
by the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and seeks to 
open up payday lending in states like New York before the CFPB takes such 
steps.
Groups in New York increasingly recognize the need to reframe the debate 
over payday lending. Millions of New Yorkers are struggling to make ends 
meet, but the answer to their income shortfalls is not greater fi nancial 
distress caused by predatory loans. Devising a “better payday loan” is not 
the goal. Rather, we should actively promote savings; support community 
development fi nancial institutions, especially neighborhood-based credit 
unions; and work diligently to ensure that all people have a living wage and 
broader economic security.
Conclusion
Fortunately, the New York payday loan bill was stopped this year. 
Unfortunately, payday lending proposals in New York are like the creature 
from the lagoon that keeps rearing its head even when you think it’s gone. 
Some advocates expect to see the industry back in Albany before long, 
pushing another payday loan bill. Th e work continues.
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North Carolina Snapshot
Ending payday lending was like rooting out kudzu aft er years of growth in 
the summer heat.  Every advocacy and enforcement tool imaginable was 
used to rid North Carolina of the stubborn root of greed that pervades the 
payday loan industry.
On March 1, 2006, North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper 
announced a settlement with three payday lenders. Th e action marked the 
end of storefront payday lending in North Carolina – the culmination of a 
six-year campaign to end payday lending in the state. 
Ten years earlier, in 1996, North Carolina had authorized payday lending 
under its check-cashing laws, by classifying payday loans as “deferred 
presentment checks.” Th is camoufl aging enabled payday lenders to 
circumvent the state’s Consumer Finance Act, which sets a 36 percent APR 
limit for specifi ed loans. 
Between 1996 and 2001, the number of payday lenders in North Carolina 
grew to more than 800 stores. Although some were single-store operations 
with local owners, most were national chains such as Ace Cash Express or 
Advance America. By one estimate, these outfi ts charged consumers almost 
$100 million a year in fees and interest.
According to Reinvestment Partners’ 2002 report, Small Loans, Big Bucks: 
An Analysis of the Payday Lending Industry in North Carolina, which 
analyzed data collected by the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks, 17 
percent of borrowers generated more than 33 percent of payday lenders’ 
revenue. Th ese borrowers were likely to fall into a debt trap because they 
renewed their loans – on average more than 18 times a year – when they 
were unable to pay them off . With loss rates approaching 20 percent, stores 
depended on fi nding borrowers who would repeatedly refi nance their 
loans. With each renewal, payday lenders exacted an additional round 
of fees, and generated disproportionately high revenue by catching a 
percentage of borrowers in repeat transactions.  
Th e state law authorizing payday lending contained an important sunset 
provision that set August 2001 as the date for determining possible 
reauthorization of payday lending. State legislators, the Governor, the 
Attorney General, and a mobilized base of advocates successfully rallied to 
deny the reauthorization. But only some payday lenders closed their doors. 
While the independent storefronts either sold out to the chains or shut 
down, the national chains affi  liated with out-of-state banks, which did not 
have to comply with the state’s 36 percent usury cap, and thereby enabled 
the payday lenders to evade the law. 
Advocates therefore turned their attention to addressing preemption of 
state laws by out-of-state banks that were making payday loans in North 
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Carolina. Th ese banks included First Bank of Delaware, County Bank of 
Rehoboth Beach, BankWest, and Republic Bank & Trust. As a result, policy 
campaigns to stop payday lending in North Carolina suddenly turned on 
the ability of local groups to infl uence federal regulators. Th e goal was to 
end partnerships between payday lenders and banks. 
Th e Offi  ce of Th rift  Supervision, Offi  ce of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
and Federal Reserve Board sought to discourage and end partnerships 
between banks and payday lenders.  Th e FDIC, however, allowed the 
partnerships to fl ourish.  When the FDIC changed leadership in 2005, 
it also changed its policy, eff ectively ending the bank-payday lender 
partnership. Th is forced the payday lenders to settle with the North 
Carolina Attorney General, as they had no basis for claiming federal pre-
emption from the state’s usury cap.   
Results: Demand Evaporates
Despite payday lenders’ claims that chaos would ensue if they were not 
permitted to operate in North Carolina, research by the UNC Center for 
Community Capital shows that the state’s ban on payday lending has not 
diminished credit availability for people in the state, and has “helped more 
households than it has harmed.”1   
Like an annual migration, payday lenders continue to seek support from 
North Carolina’s General Assembly to reauthorize payday lending in 
the state. With a new political party in control of the House, Senate, and 
Governorship, payday lenders succeeded in getting a new bill introduced 
in 2013. Public Policy Polling then released a study, in February 2013, 
showing that 73% of North Carolinians favored keeping the current 
restrictions in place and that 72% were “less likely” to vote for a legislator 
that supported the bill.  As a result, the bill died in committee. 
Th e Bank Payday Loan
In 2012, Regions Bank introduced its ReadyAdvance payday loan 
product in a few of its bank branches in North Carolina. Like all payday 
lenders, Regions bank charged exorbitant rates for its short-term loans. 
Borrowers paid one dollar in fees for every ten dollars in advances, as 
well as 21 percent simple interest during the period when the balance was 
outstanding. Th e loan term could last as long as 35 days, but the bank 
could collect any outstanding debt with the next direct deposit. Regions 
has asserted that it can hide behind its licensure as a check casher in the 
state of Alabama in order to evade North Carolina’s law against payday 
lending. 
1 “North Carolina Consumers Aft er Payday Lending:  Attitudes and Experiences with 
Credit Options,” November 2007, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Center for 
Community Capitalism, Roberto G. Quercia and Janneke Ratcliff e. 
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Th e North Carolina Attorney General and advocates launched a campaign 
to end the bank’s payday lending in the state. Responding to street protests, 
regulatory complaints, and media criticism, Regions Bank decided in 
January 2013 that it would no longer off er the ReadyAdvance product in 
North Carolina. Th e broad-based, vocal opposition to payday lending has 
deterred other banks that make payday loans in other states  – including 
banks with substantial North Carolina branch footprints, such as Wells 
Fargo and Fift h Th ird Bank – from making them in North Carolina. 
Reinvestment Partners campaign visual in the fi ght to end payday lending.
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Recommendations
Payday loans perpetuate fundamental inequities in our economic system 
and are an especially toxic loan product that exploits the fact that millions 
of people don’t earn enough money to make ends meet. Broader systemic 
change is needed to enable low- and moderate-income people to earn a 
living wage, cover basic living expenses, and save money. In the short term, 
however, state and federal governments can and should undertake the 
following specifi c policy changes to end payday loan abuses:
• Congress and state legislatures should set a rate cap of 36 percent or 
lower for all credit transactions. 
Payday lenders have thrived in states that do not have a strong rate cap 
for small-dollar loans, despite eff orts to restrict payday lending through 
other consumer protections. It is critical that Congress set a 36 percent 
federal rate cap for all credit transactions to end usurious payday lending 
by storefront, online, and bank payday lenders. Th e federal rate cap must 
include language ensuring that stronger state rate caps are not preempted. 
It is also critical that states institute rate caps of 36 percent or lower and 
strongly enforce them against all bank and non-bank payday lenders. 
• Th e CFPB should enact strong rules to curb abusive payday lending.
Although the CFPB lacks authority under the Dodd-Frank Act to institute 
rate caps, the agency has broad rule-writing and enforcement authority 
to limit abusive lending practices by storefront, online, and bank payday 
lenders. Th e CFPB should enact strong rules, for example, that require 
lenders to underwrite small-dollar loans based on borrowers’ ability to 
repay (while covering existing expenses and debts); prohibit rollovers and 
balloon payments; and ban credit and payday advance products on prepaid 
cards.
• Th e OCC and FDIC should adopt and strengthen their proposed 
guidance on bank payday lending, and the Federal Reserve Board 
should follow suit. 
Th e OCC and FDIC’s proposed rules, issued in April 2013, strike at the 
heart of abusive bank payday lending by requiring banks to underwrite 
“deposit advance” loans to assess a borrower’s ability to repay, and by 
restricting banks’ ability to trap borrowers in a cycle of debt. To further 
strengthen the proposed rules, the OCC and FDIC should institute a rate 
cap for “deposit advance” loans and limit banks’ ability to automatically 
reach into their customers’ accounts to collect on loans. Unlike the CFPB, 
the prudential regulators have authority to institute rate caps on bank 
payday loans. Th e Federal Reserve Board should adopt rules consistent 
with the FDIC/OCC rules on bank payday lending.  
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Conclusion
Payday lending is among the most harmful forms of credit. Th e 
experiences of four key states, California, Illinois, New York, and North 
Carolina, refl ect a range of payday loan regulatory frameworks – from 
all-out prohibition to lax regulation and oversight.  Th ese state snapshots 
underscore the urgent need for strong federal action to end payday 
lending. State action is also critically needed to ensure responsible lending 
and fair access to credit. If we believe that a fair fi nancial system is a 
predicate to racial and economic justice, then ending payday lending is 
nothing short of a moral imperative.
